not expected to ignore information relevant to the firm's going-concern status, SAS No. 34 states that auditors need not search for this informa tion because "in the absence of information to the contrary. an entity's continuation is usually assumed in financial accounting" (AU §340, SAS No. 34). SAS No. 34 also offers no specific guidelines regarding the time period to be evaluated in going-concern investigations. In contrast, SAS No. 59 states that the auditor "must evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern for a rea sonable period of time, not to exceed one year beyond the date of the audited fi nancial statements" (AU §341, SAS No. 59). Although SAS No. 59 notes that the auditor is not reguired to design audit procedures solely for the purpose of evaluating the going-concern assumption. it does state that the assumption itself must explicitly be evaluated in each au dit. Also, under SAS No. 34, "substantial doubt" about a firm's continued existence resulted in a modified report only if material uncertainties existed regarding the recoverability and classification of assets and lia bilities. In contrast, SAS No. 59 makes substantial doubt about a firm's continued existence, by itself, the "triggering point" for report modifica tion (Carmichael and Pany [1993] ). To the extent that increased auditor responsibilities and the improved communication of those responsibili ties provide better information regarding future firm viability. we predict that investors should be less surprised when bankruptcy filings follow going-concern opinions issued under SAS No. 59.
Our results show that price responses to bankruptcy announcements are, as predicted, less negative for firms receiving SAS No. 59 going concern opinions than for firms receiving SAS No. 59 clean opinions, and are less negative for firms receiving SAS No. 59 going-concern opin ions than for firms receiving SAS No. 34 "subject to" going-concern opinions. We also show that the difference between the going-concern bankruptcy surprise and the clean opinion bankruptcy surprise under SAS No. 59 is greater than the corresponding difference under SAS No.
34. 1 Our results, which hold after controlling for macroeconomic condi tions, firm-specific levels of financial distress, and the predictability of certain types of bankruptcy filings. suggest that investors have benefited from the implementation of SAS No. 59.
Section 2 presents our sample selection procedure and summary sta tistics. In sections 3 and 4 we present our hypotheses and empirical re sults and in section 5 we provide concluding remarks. show that firms receiving going-concern opinions are more highly lever aged and Jess profitable than firms receiving clean opinions. To draw inferences regarding bankruptcy probabilities, we use the revised Altman
Sample Characteristics
[1983] Z-score model. This model predicts bankruptcy for firms with scores less than 1.20 and suggests a "gray area" for scores between 1.20 and 2.90. The mean Z-score of -0.06 for the 107 going-concern firms is significantly lower than the mean of 1.51 for the 110 clean opinion firms, suggesting that going-concern opinions are more likely to be is sued to firms in severe financial distress (see also McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood [1991] ). This result obtains both across the entire sample and within the SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 partitions. It is consistent with previous research (e.g., Mutchler [1985] and Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler [1989; 1994] ) which shows that going-concern opinions can often be predicted through ratio analysis and can themselves be useful in predicting bankruptcy.
Hypotheses and Univariate Tests
Our empirical tests, which compare share price responses (i.e., inves tor responses to bankruptcy news) both within and across time periods, are based on the following four hypotheses: Rank-sum tests for median differences yield directly comparable results. Debt·to·assets is defined as total liabilities/total assets. Return on assets is defined as net income/total assets. Z.score is calculated using the method of Altman (1983] . All values are taken from the last set of financial statements preceding the bankruptcy filing. We define the announcement-period excess return as the difference between the sample firm's return and the return for the sample firm's CRSP size decile portfolio from day -1 to day + 1, relative to the bank ruptcy filing announcement. 5 Across the complete sample of firms the mean excess return for firms receiving going-concern opinions is -23%, significantly smaller (p < 0.01) than the mean excess return of -33% for firms receiving clean opinions. Therefore, consistent with CC, going concern opinions in general do appear to reduce the surprise associated with bankruptcy filings. Our univariate analysis also suggests that the sur prise is reduced more under SAS No. 59 than it was under SAS No. 34. Specifically, the mean excess return for SAS No. 59 going-concern firms of -19% is smaller (p < 0.01) than the mean excess return of -35% for SAS No. 59 clean opinion firms and is also smaller (p = 0.04) than the mean response of -28% for SAS No. 34 going-concern firms. However, we detect no statistically significant difference (p = 0.30) between going concern and clean opinion price responses ( -28% and -33%, respec tively) under SAS No. 34. Our univariate findings support H2, H3, and H4 but not HI.
HI

Multivariate Tests
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
To investigate the relation between bankruptcy surprises and audit opinions in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following model:
In equation (1) audit opinion in either period. These two indicator variables in combi nation with the interaction term are used to test Hypotheses 1-4. The remaining variables are control measures. Mutchler [1985] shows that going-concern opinions often can be predicted through ratio anal ysis. To control for the possibility that the reduced bankruptcy surprise is attributable to financial measures rather than the going-concern opin ion, we incorporate a ratio-based measure of financial distress (BKPROB), defined as Altman's [1983] Z-score multiplied by -1 and calculated as of the last financial statement date prior to the bankruptcy filing. 6 We in clude RUNUP to control for price changes occurring prior to the issu ance of the audit report. RUNUP is equal to the firm's decile-adjusted excess return calculated from day -240 to day -10, relative to the release of the last 10-K preceding the bankruptcy filing.
In addition to BKPROB and RUNUP, we include PREDIC1; CPI, and GDP to further control for factors that could influence the surprise associated with bankruptcy filing announcements. With PREDICTwe model the re duction in bankruptcy surprise that may be attributable to the predict ability of certain types of filings or to the richness of the firm's informa tion environment (in the spirit of McNichols and Manegold [1983] ).
Specifically, PREDICT is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm's bankruptcy is prepackaged or is due to union disputes or litigation,
or if the firm is in the top half of the CRSP market capitalization distri bution during the bankruptcy announcement year. 7 If investors are less surprised by filings that are inherently more predictable or by filings made by firms with greater media coverage, the coefficient for PREDICT should be positive. With CPI and GDP we attempt to control for broad changes in the macroeconomic environment occurring across our sample period. 8 CPI and GDP represent the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index and Gross Domestic Product, respectively, for the year of the bankruptcy filing. 9 To the extent that higher rates of inflation or lower rates of eco nomic growth are indicative of an unfavorable macroeconomic environ ment, we expect investors to be less surprised by bankruptcy filings in general when these conditions obtain. Therefore, we expect the coeffi cient for CPI to be positive and the coefficient for GDP to be negative. 6 We multiply the Z-score by -1 to simplify interpretation of the regression coefficient.
Higher values of BKPROB (i.e., the transformed Z-score) correspond to higher probabili ties of bankruptcy.
i Prepackaged bankruptcies or bankruptcies resulting from union disputes or litigation are more likely to be priced prior to the actual filing announcement. Furthermore, Mc Connell, Lease, and Tashjian [1996) show that prepacks typically are less costly than other types of bankruptcies. which likely would decrease the magnitude of the measured response.
8 RUNUP should control for some of these eff ects as well, given that it is defined in terms of deviations from market (i.e., decile-adjusted) returns.
9 Our results are unchanged when CPI and GDP are defined in terms of lagged percent age changes. As previously mentioned, our primary test coefficients are y1, Y2· and y3. These coefficients, taken individually and in subsets, are used to test Hypotheses l-4. To illustrate more formally how the multivariate model addresses our hypotheses, table 2 summarizes the tests we propose. Pos itive estimates for Y 2 and (y2 + y3) would support Hl and H2, respec tively, while positive estimates for Y 3 and (y1 + yg) would support H3 and H4. Table 3 presents the results associated with OLS estimation of equation (1). 10 Like CC, we find a significant (p = 0.05) negati\'e relation between 10We remove nine observations having studentized residuals with absolute values higher than 2.00. Alternative screens suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch [ 1 980] pro duce directly comparable results. If no outliers are removed, the model's adjusted R2 de creases but the indh·idual coefficient estimates remain significant. date. SAS59 = 1 (0) if the firm filed for bankruptcy after (before) SAS No . .59 was adopted. GC = 1 (0) if the firm received a going-concern (clean) audit opinion. BKPROB =Altman's [1983) Z-score multiplied by -1. RUNUP= cumulative excess decile-adjusted return from day -250 to day -10 relative to the last financial statement filing date prior to bankruptcy. PREDICT= I if bankruptcy is prepackaged or due to union disputes or litigation, or if firm is in the tOp half of CRSP market capitalization distribution; = 0 otherwise. CPI = % change in the Con sumer Price Index in the bankruptcy filing year. GDP=% change in the Gross Domestic Product in the bankruptcy filing year.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
bankruptcy probability (BKPROB) and excess returns. Two of the three additional control variables not modeled by CC are significant as well.
The positive estimate for PREDICT indicates that investors are less sur prised by bankruptcy announcements that are more predictable. Simi larly, the positive estimate for CPI and the negative, albeit insignificant, estimate for GDP suggest that bankruptcy shocks are smaller when the macroeconomic environment is relatively unfavorable. ll
The coefficients associated with SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 going concern opinions support three of our four hypotheses. l2 In contrast to CC, we do not find that SAS No. 34 going-concern opinions reduce, rela tive to SAS No. 34 clean opinions, the surprise associated with bankruptcy fi lings. Therefore, we do not find support for HI. When our macroeco nomic controls are excluded from the model, however, the findings are generally consistent with CC (the coefficient for GC is significant at p = 0.07). We conjecture that a portion of the SAS No. 34 going-concern effect documented by Chen and Church [1996] may be attributable to correlated, omitted economic factors that we model more fully.
In contrast to the minimal SAS No. 34 effect, going-concern opinions. and that the difference between the going concern bankruptcy surprise and the clean opinion bankruptcy surprise under SAS No. 59 is greater than the corresponding difference under SAS No. 34. These results hold after controlling for the predictability of the bankruptcy filing, the macroeconomic environment during the an nouncement year, and firm-specific levels of financial distress.
